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Introduction
Incidents resulting in loss of life or loss of spacecraft drive thorough investigation by independent boards and publication of 
accident reports.  Much can be learned from well-written descriptions of the technical and organizational factors that lead to 
an accident (Challenger, Columbia).1,2 Subsequent analysis by third parties of investigation reports and associated evidence 
collected during the investigations can lead to additional insight.3-7 Much can also be learned from documented close calls 
that do not result in loss of life or a spacecraft, such as the Mars Exploration Rover Spirit software anomaly, the SOHO 
mission interruption, and the NEAR burn anomaly.8-10
Seven space shuttle incidents discussed in this paper fall into the latter category:
• Rendezvous Target Failure On STS-41B
• Rendezvous Radar Anomaly and Trajectory Dispersion On STS-32
• Rendezvous Lambert Targeting Anomaly on STS-49
• Rendezvous Lambert Targeting Anomaly Before STS-51
• Zero Doppler Steering Maneuver Anomaly Before STS-59
• Excessive Propellant Consumption During Rendezvous On STS-69
• Global Positioning System Receiver and Associated Shuttle Flight Software Anomalies on STS-91
None were a threat to safety of flight.  Procedural work-arounds or software changes prevented them from threatening 
mission success.  Extensive investigations, which included the independent recreation of the anomalies by multiple Shuttle 
Program organizations, were the key to determining the cause, accurately assessing risk, and identifying software and 
software process improvements.   Lessons learned from these incidents not only validated long-standing operational best 
practices, but serve to promote discussion and mentoring among Shuttle Program personnel and are applicable to future 
space flight programs. 
STS-51 STS-59 STS-91STS-69
STS-32 STS-49STS-41B
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Crew
CDR Vance D. Brand
PLT Robert L. Gibson
MS Bruce McCandless II
MS Ronald E. McNair
MS Robert L. Stewart
CDR Daniel C. Brandenstein 
PLT James D. Wetherbee 
MS Bonnie J. Dunbar
MS G. David Low
MS Marsha S. Ivins
CDR Daniel C. Brandenstein 
PLT Kevin P. Chilton
MS Pierre J. Thuot
MS Kathryn C. Thornton
MS Richard J. Hieb 
MS Thomas D. Akers
MS Bruce E. Melnick
CDR Frank L. Culbertson 
PLT William F. Readdy 
MS James H. Newman 
MS Daniel W. Bursch
MS Carl E. Walz
CDR Sidney M. Gutierrez
PLT Kevin P. Chilton 
PLC Linda M. Godwin 
MS Jay Apt
MS Michael R. Clifford
MS Thomas D. Jones
CDR David M. Walker
PLT Kenneth D. Cockrell
PLC James S. Voss
MS James H. Newman 
MS Michael L. Gernhardt
CDR Charles J. Precourt, 
PLT Dominic L. Pudwill Gorie
MS Wendy B. Lawrence
MS Franklin R. Chang-Diaz 
MS Janet L. Kavandi
MS Valery V. Ryumin
Mission
Objectives 
• Deploy WESTAR-VI & 
PALAPA-B2
• First test of Manned 
Maneuvering Unit
• First Rendezvous 
Demonstration
• Deploy SYNCOM IV-F5
• Retrieve LDEF
• Intelsat VI Repair
• Deploy ACTS/TOS
• Deploy/Retrieve
ORFEUS-SPAS
• Space Radar Lab 
(SRL-1)
• Deploy & Retrieve
SPARTAN 201-03
& Wake Shield
Facility 2
• 9th & Final Mission 
to Mir
Orbiter
Challenger
Columbia
Endeavour
(First Flight)
Discovery
Endeavour
Endeavour
Discovery
Shuttle 
Mission
41B
32
49
51
59
69
91
Landing
2/11/84
First KSC
Landing
1/20/90
Edwards
5/16/92
Edwards
9/22/93
KSC
4/20/94
Edwards
9/18/95
KSC
6/12/98
KSC
Launch
2/3/84
Pad 39A
1/9/90
Pad 39A
5/7/92
Pad 39B
9/12/93
Pad 39B
4/9/94
Pad 39A
9/7/95
Pad 39A
6/2/98
Pad 39A
CDR – Commander, KSC – Kennedy Space Center, MS – Mission Specialist, PLC – Payload Commander, 
PLT – Pilot
Table 1  Space Shuttle Missions Discussed In This Report
Orbital
Inclination
28.5º
28.5º
28.35º
28.45º
57º
28.4º
51.6º
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Rendezvous Target Failure On STS-41B
The goal of the mission of Challenger on STS-41B (February 1984) was to perform 
the first demonstration of the space shuttle’s integrated rendezvous navigation and 
maneuver targeting capability.11 This demonstration was important to reduce risk 
to the Solar Maximum Mission rendezvous and satellite repair scheduled for the 
following April on STS-41C.  The Integrated Rendezvous Target (IRT) would serve 
as the target spacecraft (Figure 1).  After the rendezvous, ground radars would track 
the IRT for an atmospheric drag study.
Other mission objectives included deployment of the WESTAR-VI and PALAPA-
B2 communications satellites with their Payload Assist Module-D (PAM-D) 
propulsion units, and the first demonstration of Manned Maneuvering Unit 
(MMU).  The MMU permitted untethered Extra-Vehicular Activities (EVA) and 
would be used as the primary means to capture Solar Max on STS-41C.
Integrated Rendezvous Target 
The IRT was a 200 lb. satellite to be deployed from the forward shuttle payload bay 
Get-Away Special canister beam.  It consisted of a 6 meter diameter, one-mil thick 
aluminized Mylar balloon, an inflation system, and ballast (Figure 2).  The balloon, 
to be inflated after deployment, was white in color, except for one panel painted 
infrared black (Figures 3 and 4).  The IRT provided known radar signal reflection 
and atmospheric drag characteristics for the rendezvous demonstration and orbital 
decay study.
Figure 1  IRT project patch showing 
stave separation and balloon inflation.
N
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Figure 2  Engineering drawing of the IRT balloon
and inflation system. 
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A
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Diffuser BagDiffuser Can
2 Meter Balloon
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Figure 4  Deflated IRT balloon.
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Figure 3  Test inflation of the back-up IRT balloon 
in a thermal vacuum test chamber.
N
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Figure 5  IRT deployment sequence.
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Deployment Mechanism
Staves Separate
Inflation Complete
Planned Rendezvous Demonstration
The IRT was to be deployed from Challenger at 1.5 feet/second in a retrograde direction by a spring mechanism (Figure 5).  
At deployment three lanyards were to be pulled to activate two delayed pyrotechnic charges and to close a balloon bleed 
valve.  Approximately one minute after deployment, at a range of approximately 75 feet, the first delayed pyrotechnic charge 
was to fire and separate the staves from the un-inflated balloon and inflation hardware.  The second delayed pyrotechnic 
charge was to fire at approximately 80 seconds after deployment to initiate inflation of the balloon with gaseous nitrogen.
During deployment the IRT was to be tracked using laser rangefinders that were a part of the payload bay Closed Circuit 
Tele-Vision (CCTV) system to evaluate the usefulness of the CCTV lasers as a source of range and range rate data during 
proximity operations.  Soon after deployment rendezvous radar acquisition of the IRT was to occur and the radar data 
would be processed by the shuttle’s rendezvous navigation software.  A separation burn was to take Challenger to a position 
approximately 8 nautical miles behind the IRT.  During a period of 3.5 hours after deployment rendezvous radar, star 
tracker, and Crew Optical Alignment Sight (COAS) data was to be processed by the shuttle rendezvous navigation system, 
and several maneuvers were to be targeted using the on-board software.
One or two days of relative navigation, maneuver targeting, and maneuver execution activities could be conducted based on 
other mission planning constraints.  Challenger could rendezvous with the IRT on the same day as the deploy, or phase out 
overnight to a range of approximately 140 nautical miles and rendezvous the next day.   In either case, Challenger was to use a 
rendezvous profile similar to that planned for the STS-41C Solar Max rendezvous and repair to further exercise the on-
board rendezvous navigation and maneuver targeting capabilities.
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Mission Results
The WESTAR-VI satellite was deployed but failed to achieve the desired geosynchronous orbit due to a failure of the PAM-
D unit.  Deployment of the PALAPA-B was delayed for two days as it used the same PAM-D stage. However, the 
PALAPA-B PAM-D stage malfunctioned as it did after the WESTAR-VI deploy.  Both satellites were later recovered on 
STS-51A (November 1984).11
The IRT was deployed on February 5th.  The crew reported that the IRT staves did not separate after deployment, and that 
the balloon inflated inside the staves and burst.  Due to the potential for re-contact with IRT debris the crew performed a 
breakout maneuver.  The rendezvous demonstration was canceled.
Some rendezvous navigation sensor data was collected.  The rendezvous radar maintained track of the IRT debris to a range 
well over 100,000 feet.  Three data collection periods for COAS data and four for star tracker data were performed.  The last 
star tracker data was obtained at a range of ~60 nautical miles. The crew was able to visually track the IRT debris at ~62 
nautical miles.  The IRT re-entered the atmosphere on February 11.  No CCTV laser data was collected after the IRT 
deployment, but some data was collected during MMU flight testing in close proximity to Challenger.  Laser range rate data 
was too noisy to be used as a piloting aid.
Rendezvous navigation and maneuver targeting performance on the next mission, STS-41C (April 1984) was successful.  
Two rendezvous profiles were successfully executed before Solar Max was captured and placed in the payload bay of 
Challenger for repair.
Cause of the IRT Failure
A post-flight investigation revealed that a lanyard connection failed open which prevented activation of a delayed action 
pyrotechnic charge that would have triggered the stave cable cutter sequence.  An improper crimping tool was used when the 
lanyard assembly was manufactured.  A different type of lanyard connection that was less susceptible to failure should have 
been used.
Lessons Learned From STS-41B
• Quality control during manufacture should be rigorous enough to ensure that proper tools, procedures, and 
materials are used. Malfunctions can result in degraded system performance or system failure that could negatively impact 
mission success or safety of flight.
• Choose component designs and system architectures that lower the risk of failure and enable the system to 
function within requirements in the presence of failures.  Some proposed component designs and system architectures 
may be more robust than others.  
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Rendezvous Radar Anomaly and Trajectory Dispersion On STS-32
The original concept for The Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF, 
Figure 6) was proposed as the first shuttle payload, called the Meteoroid 
and Exposure Module (MEM).  MEM was renamed LDEF in 1974.  
The mission of LDEF was to provide data on long-term exposure 
effects of the space environment on various materials.  The requirement 
to retrieve the gravity gradient stabilized LDEF with the shuttle (along 
with Solar Max) drove extensive development of shuttle proximity
operations procedures due to plume impingement concerns in the mid 
and late 1970s.11 LDEF was designed and constructed at NASA 
Langley between January 1976 and August 1978.  LDEF was deployed
from the Shuttle Challenger during mission STS-41C on April 7, 1984, at 
an altitude of approximately 275 nautical miles.  
Figure 7  A button worn by many 
Shuttle Program personnel before 
and during the flight of STS-32.
Planning For LDEF Retrieval
LDEF was supposed to have been retrieved in March of 1985 on STS-51D, then in 
September of 1986 by STS-61I.  However, this mission was canceled due to the loss 
of the Shuttle Challenger.  Once shuttle missions resumed Columbia was scheduled to 
retrieve LDEF on STS-32.  Higher priority missions prevented the LDEF from 
being retrieved sooner after the September 1988 return to flight Accelerated LDEF 
orbital decay due to the solar maximum (Figures 7 and 8), Columbia launch delays, 
and the SYNCOM IV-5 deploy two days before the LDEF rendezvous complicated 
mission planning.  Orbital lifetime prediction of LDEF had a high degree of 
uncertainty, and experience with Skylab in 1978 and 1979 heightened concerns that 
LDEF could reenter the atmosphere before retrieval (Figures 9 and 10).  It was 
desired to retrieve LDEF before it decayed to 160 nautical miles, as the aerodynamic 
torque could exceed the gravity gradient torque and cause the satellite to tumble.
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Figure 6  LDEF after deployment from 
Challenger.
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Figure 8  Plot of monthly mean sunspot numbers from January 1984 to February 1990.
Date Source - ftp://ftp.ngdc.noaa.gov/STP/SOLAR_DATA/SUNSPOT_NUMBERS/, accessed March 14, 2006.
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Figure 9  September 1989 predicted orbital decay of LDEF.  Plot courtesy of NASA/Cheryl Andrews.
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Figure 10  Actual and predicted orbital decay of LDEF. Plot courtesy of 
NASA/Cheryl Andrews.
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STS-32 Rendezvous and LDEF Retrieval
Columbia was finally launched on January 9, 1990.  Due 
to the size of large LDEF the crew was able to visually 
acquire it the day before the rendezvous at a range of 
about 100 nautical miles.  Radar lock (Figure 11) on the 
LDEF began per published crew procedures at a range 
of 148,500 ft, just before the second star tracker pass 
(Figure 12, Item 2).  Rendezvous procedures had been 
written based on the pre-flight planned trajectory.  This 
trajectory showed that radar would not be acquired until 
after the NCC burn, and that radar data would not be 
incorporated until after the NCC maneuver was 
complete (Figure 12).  Even though the radar locked on 
early, the data looked good, and Mission Control 
requested that the radar data be incorporated into 
navigation. 
Figure 11  Location of the shuttle rendezvous radar.  The photos
were taken during the STS-114 R Bar Pitch Maneuver (RPM) as 
Discovery approached the International Space Station on July 
28, 2005.
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The onboard solution for the NCC maneuver (Figure 12) was 4 feet/second higher than expected, but was burned. After the 
NCC burn, radar range, range rate, and angles were processed (Figure 12, Item 5).  However, several range rate spikes led to 
Mission Control to ask the crew to inhibit range rate processing.  Radar range and angles continued to be processed for the 
rest of the rendezvous.  Onboard rendezvous navigation filter performance during the rest of the rendezvous was as 
expected.  The larger NCC burn resulted in a miss of the desired point of the next burn, Transition Initiation (Ti) by about 
4.9 nautical miles (Figure 12, Item 6). 
The final closing trajectory on LDEF was at a higher relative velocity than expected, but the crew performed additional 
braking and began the proximity operations phase.  Columbia arrived on the –R Bar (above LDEF) within one minute of the 
pre-flight predicted time (Figure 14).  The gravity gradient stabilized LDEF was in the expected attitude.  The LDEF grapple 
(Figure 15) with the Remote Manipulator System (RMS) and berthing in the payload bay was successfully accomplished 
without incident, with only a few weeks of LDEF orbital lifetime left (Figure 10).  
Investigation of the Radar Anomaly
Post-flight analysis indicated that the star tracker data alone would have provided accurate data for a satisfactory NCC burn 
solution.  It was discovered that at extreme range (but still shorter than the maximum tracking range based on signal 
strength) a variable range measurement bias was introduced by the radar hardware.  The bias, which increases with increasing 
range, corrupts both range and range rate measurements while the signal strength remained acceptable.  This maximum 
effective range of the radar was a design limitation concerning transmission pulse timing rather than a performance limitation 
on signal strength.  This maximum effective range defined by the introduction of the bias fell between the certified maximum 
range and the maximum tracking range (Figure 16).  While radar data was good when lock-on was achieved (Figure 12, Item 
2), the maximum effective range was exceeded during the second star tracker pass (Figure 12, item 3), which led to the biased 
_
During the star tracker pass star tracker angle 
measurements and radar range and radar range rate 
measurements were processed.  The quality of the 
radar range and range rate data began to degrade 
during the pass, and the onboard navigation filter 
rejected two range rate measurements (Figure 13 and 
Figure 12, item 4).  The radar measurements were 
noisier than expected, and the quality of the onboard 
navigation state was degraded.  Radar range and range 
rate data was inhibited at Mission Control request, 
while star tracker data processing continued.  The star 
tracker pass was completed without incident.
Figure 13  Portion of a screen print of a Mission 
Control display showing two rejected radar range rate 
measurements during the star tracker pass.
N
AS
A
Figure 15  LDEF after grappling by the 
RMS of Columbia on STS-32 on 
January 12, 1990.
Figure 14  Columbia Approach to LDEF
+ R Bar
+ V Bar
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range and range rate measurements, and the rejection of two range rate measurements by the navigation filter (Figure 12, 
Item 4, and Figure 13).
The bias phenomenon and the range over which it can occur is a characteristic of the radar’s design and was known to 
shuttle personnel very early in the program (late 1970s & early 1980s), but the knowledge had not been preserved and 
incorporated into procedures documents.  At the time of STS-32 Shuttle Program personnel were only aware of the certified 
maximum tracking range and the longer maximum tracking range limit of the radar.  Knowledge of the design limitation 
surfaced only after investigation team members contacted one of the original radar design engineers who had retired several 
years before.  
In addition, signal strength at the long ranges during STS-32 was found to be lower (but still acceptable) and signals noisier 
than at closer ranges (after NCC) at which radar data was normally processed.  STS-51I was the only other mission during 
which radar data was acquired before the effective range limit. However, the range from Discovery to the SYNCOM 
decreased to below the maximum effective radar range before data was incorporated into navigation, thus avoiding the radar 
measurement bias (Table 2).
After STS-32, procedures and training were modified so that radar data would only be processed at ranges where the bias 
could not occur (Figure 16 and the dashed line in Figure 12).  An investigation was conducted to determine if any additional 
information about the rendezvous radar had been lost that could result in performance problems.
Lesson Learned From STS-32
• Fully document the design and performance characteristics of sensors both inside and outside of the certified 
performance envelope. Sensors may be capable of both nominal and off-nominal performance outside of the certified 
performance envelope.  Any design or performance limitations in this region should be documented and incorporated into 
procedures or software to prevent use of anomalous data, or enable use of the sensor outside the certified envelope when 
needed.
Table 2  Radar Acquisition and Processing History
Radar Data
Acquired Before 
Effective Limit
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Date
April 1984
November 1984
November 1984
April 1985
June 1985
Aug./Sept. 1985
January 1990
Shuttle 
Mission
41C
51A
51A
51D
51G
51I
32
Target
Solar Max
Palapa-B2
Westar-VI
SYNCOM IV-3
SPARTAN-101
SYNCOM IV-3
LDEF
Orbiter
Challenger
Discovery 
Discovery 
Discovery 
Discovery 
Discovery 
Columbia
Radar Data
Processed Before 
Effective Limit
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Figure 16  Certified, effective, and maximum tracking ranges of the rendezvous radar.  
Range at the NCC maneuver is trajectory dependent.
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Rendezvous Lambert Targeting Anomaly On STS-49
The mission of STS-49 was to rendezvous with, capture, and attach a new Perigee Kick Motor to the stranded INTELSAT 
VI (F-3) communications satellite.11 The satellite would then be deployed so it could resume its mission and reach an 
operational geosynchronous orbit.  While the mission was successful, three rendezvous profiles and three Extra-Vehicular 
Activities (EVAs) were performed before INTELSAT was finally captured and berthed in the payload bay of Endeavour, due 
to problems with the original satellite capture technique.  During the third rendezvous, a Lambert targeting failure forced the 
crew and Mission Control to execute alternate procedures that had been practiced for years in simulations, but had never 
before been done in flight.  STS-49 was one of the most challenging space shuttle missions ever flown.  Firsts for this 
mission include:
• A record three rendezvous profiles were successfully flown.  
• The longest space walk in U.S. history up to that time.  
• Four space walks performed in one mission.  
• The first and so far only time three astronauts performed an EVA at once.  
• Attachment of a new rocket motor to a satellite.
• Development of a new satellite capture technique during a mission.  
• First execution of a rendezvous delay maneuver.
• First use of a proximity operations situational awareness program with data from laser sensors.
The cause of the Lambert targeting failure was corrected after the mission.  However, a software feature added after STS-49 
to improve Lambert targeting performance caused another targeting failure five days before the launch of STS-51.  This 
anomaly was later corrected as well.
Deployment Failure Strands the INTELSAT VI (F-3) Satellite
On March, 14, 1990, the INTELSAT VI (F-3) communications satellite (Figure 17) was launched by a commercial Titan-3.  
The Titan second stage failed to separate from the satellite and its Perigee Kick Motor (PKM).  This prevented the satellite 
from continuing its mission and reaching the intended orbit.  An omni antenna was deployed to receive ground commands 
(Figure 18), but all other antennas remained stowed. Satellite controllers on the ground commanded the INTELSAT to 
separate from the PKM, leaving the PKM attached to the Titan-3 second stage.
Figure 17  Operational configuration of an INTELSAT VI communications satellite.
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A crew member inside the orbiter would maneuver the EVA crewman into the INTELSAT capture position.  A second 
EVA crew member was in the shuttle payload bay.  Once the INTELSAT was captured (a soft dock), any rotation and 
nutation would be halted using a steering wheel on the capture bar.  After the EVA crew hard docked the capture bar to the 
INTELSAT, the RMS would grapple the capture bar (see Figure 20) and position the satellite in the payload bay so the EVA 
crew could berth it.  The new PKM would then be attached to the INTELSAT by the EVA crew.
Ground commands spin-stabilized the spacecraft, at 25 Revolutions Per Minute (RPM), and 
it was placed in a stable power and thermal configuration.  Maneuvers were performed to 
place the satellite in a high enough orbit to prevent reentry and to minimize atomic oxygen 
impacts to the solar cells.  The maneuvers were conducted with the two liquid apogee 
motors.  The INTELSAT orbit was adjusted over several days from an approximately 93 by 
193 nautical mile orbit to an approximately 299 by 309 nautical mile orbit.
The Plan to Rescue INTELSAT With the Space Shuttle
In an attempt to salvage the satellite, a rescue and repair plan involving the space shuttle was 
developed, so a new PKM could be attached to the INTELSAT and enable it to reach an 
operational orbit.12,13 Capture of INTELSAT was to be performed by an EVA astronaut 
using a capture bar (Figures 19 and 20) while positioned on a Portable Foot Restraint 
mounted on the Remote Manipulator System (RMS, shuttle robotic arm). 
Figure 19  Position of INTELSAT for capture bar technique.
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Figure 20  Capture bar used in capture attempts on flight days 4 and 5.
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New Proximity Operations Tools Flown On STS-49
The use of a new proximity operations situational awareness program and new laser sensors were to play an important role 
in the success of STS-49.  During shuttle systems development in the 1970s three proximity operations sensors were 
identified and developed.11 These included rendezvous radar (range, range rate, and angles), range data derived from Crew 
Optical Alignment Sight (COAS) subtended angles, and Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) camera ranging rulers.  While 
these data sources were flight proven, they were not optimal for proximity operations in terms of the operating envelope 
and procedural complexity.  An early generation laser sensor had been flown on STS-41B (February 1984) and STS-41C 
(April 1984), but the range rate data was too noisy to use for piloting.  This laser was a part of an auto focusing system for 
the CCTV cameras in the orbiter payload bay.  
Two later generation laser sensors (short and long range) were first flown on STS-49 for comparison with data from the 
rendezvous radar. If laser performance was acceptable for piloting cues, the crew could obtain range and range rate through 
the aft flight deck windows as a supplement to radar data. However, STS-49 proximity operations were designed so that 
mission objectives could be met without the laser data.  
Figure 21  Example of a payload bay display, Circa 1992.
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The Payload Bay program (Figure 21), hosted on a laptop computer, 
enhanced crew situational awareness of relative motion during proximity 
operations.  Payload Bay was written by Richard J. Hieb, a former Mission 
Control rendezvous officer who became an astronaut and was on the STS-
39 and STS-49 crews (Figure 22).  Payload Bay was tested by the STS-39 
crew during simulations in the Systems Engineering Simulator (SES).  
Improvements identified in the SES were incorporated into the program in 
time to support its first flight on STS-49.  Data from both the short and 
long range lasers could be provided to the Payload Bay program, along 
with radar data and CCTV camera angles.  Later it evolved into the 
Rendezvous and Proximity Operations Program (RPOP).  RPOP along 
with the Hand-Held Laser and Trajectory Control Sensor laser (mounted 
in the payload bay) were to see extensive use during missions to Mir and 
the International Space Station.14 Figure 22  Rick Hieb in the airlock 
before an STS-49 EVA.
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Rendezvous and Capture Attempts On Flight Day 4
The launch of Endeavour occurred on May 7, 1992, with the capture of the INTELSAT planned for Flight Day 4.* The 
INTELSAT then maneuvered so that it would be placed in a “control box” five hours after liftoff of the Endeavour.13
INTELSAT ground controllers reduced the satellite’s rotation rate to a value that would facilitate capture.  Two hours 
before rendezvous, ground commanding of the INTELSAT was stopped.  The rendezvous and proximity operations 
phases were successfully executed by Endeavour.  Two initial attempts to capture the INTELSAT during orbital night (with 
the Endeavour payload bay lights providing illumination) failed (Figures 23 and 24).  The capture failures modified the 
INTELSAT rotational dynamics such that a third attempt could not be safely conducted.  The crew performed a small 
maneuver to back Endeavour away from the INTELSAT, and later performed a break-out maneuver designed to safely 
separate the two spacecraft and maintain safe separation overnight so that Mission Control could reassess the situation.  
The laser sensors and Payload Bay program improved crew situational awareness, prompting them to rely more on these 
tools during proximity operations on subsequent days.
* The day of launch is Flight Day 1, and each subsequent Flight Day begins when the crew awakens from a sleep period.
Rendezvous and Capture Attempts On Flight Day 5
Two more maneuvers were performed to position the orbiter for 
another rendezvous on the next day, Flight Day 5.  The second 
rendezvous was planned so enough propellant would be available for a 
third rendezvous later in the mission, if required.  Procedural changes 
were made to the proximity operations phase to improve the chances 
of capture.  All capture attempts were to be performed in orbital 
daylight (as the INTELSAT was dark in color), based on the Flight Day 
4 experience.  Navigation, maneuver targeting, and piloting activities 
during the Flight Day 5 rendezvous were successful. The mission 
commander performed several fly-arounds of the INTELSAT to 
achieve optimal relative geometry for capture attempts (Figures 25 and 
26). However, multiple attempts to capture the INTELSAT during 
orbital daylight again failed (Figure 27). After the final attempt the 
INTELSAT was in a flat spin and the crew executed a break-out 
maneuver to safely separate the two vehicles.
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Figure 24  Sketch of actual proximity 
operations on flight day 4.
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Figure 23  Planned proximity operations for 
flight day 4.
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Figure 25  INTELSAT above the Kennedy 
Space Center before a capture attempt.
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New Capture Procedure Development on Flight Day 6
A third rendezvous and capture attempt was planned for Flight Day 7.  Since the EVA crew member could not keep the 
capture bar in contact with the INTELSAT long enough for the capture latches to fire, numerous alternate capture methods 
were discussed. Most were discarded due to operational difficulties. The crew and ground personnel concurred on using 
three EVA crew in the payload bay to capture the satellite using their gloved hands, rather than using the now suspect 
capture bar technique.
On Flight Day 6, with Endeavour at a long range behind INTELSAT, Mission Control EVA personnel and astronauts 
conducted simulations of the proposed three person EVA technique in the Weightless Environment Training Facility 
(WETF)† to evaluate the difficulties of a three person EVA and communications procedure (Figure 28).  Astronauts and 
Mission Control rendezvous personnel conducted proximity operations simulations in the Systems Engineering Simulator 
to evaluate piloting procedures and visual cues.  INTELSAT and shuttle engineering personnel examined the INTELSAT 
for “grab” areas and safety concerns.  
† The WETF was a large pool in which astronauts and engineering personnel could develop and practice EVA techniques while wearing neutrally buoyant 
EVA suits.  The Neutral Buoyancy Lab (NBL), whose larger size was needed for the International Space Station Program, later replaced the WETF.  All 
underwater EVA simulations are conducted in the presence of professional safety divers.
1. Delay Until Sunrise
2. Initial Capture Attempts
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Figure 26  Sketch of proximity operations 
after the second rendezvous on flight 
day 5.
Figure 27   EVA crewman on the RMS 
attempts to capture INTELSAT with the 
capture bar (right).  
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Proximity operations specialists conducted 
additional analysis of Shuttle Reaction Control 
System (RCS) jet plume impacts on INTELSAT 
rotational dynamics.  Since EVA crew would be 
mounted on a truss structure in the payload bay 
using foot restraints, analysis was performed to 
ensure that imparted loads during RCS jet firings 
would not exceed truss structural tolerances.  
Digital camera photos of crew sketches of 
proposed techniques were transmitted from 
Endeavour to Mission Control, and the teams on the 
ground used the photos in technique definition and 
refinement.  By the end of Flight Day 6, a 
workable plan to use three EVA crew for the 
capture was in place.
Figure 28  Astronauts developing the alternate capture 
procedure in the WETF.
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Rendezvous and the Targeting Anomaly On Flight Day 7
After Endeavour began its return to INTELSAT, two star tracker passes and a midcourse correction (NCC) maneuver were 
successfully performed (Figure 29).  However, a targeting attempt soon after NCC for the next maneuver, Transition 
Initiation (Ti‡), failed to converge on a solution (item 1 in Figure 29, Figure 30).
‡ The Transition Initiation (Ti) maneuver placed Endeavour on an intercept trajectory with INTELSAT.  The “i” in the acronym “Ti” is lowercase to avoid 
confusion with another Shuttle Program acronym.
Figure 29  Sequence of events during the third rendezvous of STS-49.
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Figure 30  Failed Ti targeting attempt recreated by the author during the investigation using the 
Software Production Facility.15 Arrow indicates alarm message seen by the crew on Endeavour.
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Mission Control rendezvous and shuttle software specialists quickly identified the source of the targeting failure to a specific
area of the Lambert targeting code.  Radar data was obtained and incorporated into the shuttle navigation solution.  In case 
the Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) software had become corrupted, the crew reloaded new GNC software from 
the Mass Memory Units into the GNC computers.   However, the targeting failure occurred again after the software reload 
(Figure 31).  The GNC software was then transmitted to Mission Control for further offline analysis.  The anomaly was 
particularly puzzling as the Lambert targeting task had been successfully executed 35 times previously during this mission.
Recovery from the Anomaly and Completion of the Flight Day 7 Rendezvous
Mission Control and other shuttle systems specialists continued to discuss the problem as the time for the Ti maneuver 
approached (Figure 29).  Three EVA crew were in the airlock and there was not enough propellant on-board to support 
both a Ti-Delay (a maneuver to buy time by delaying initiation of an intercept trajectory) and a fourth rendezvous later in 
the mission.  Mission Control personnel had lost confidence in the Lambert targeting software and decided that the 
rendezvous could be continued if the Ti and subsequent maneuvers were computed by Mission Control and transmitted to 
the crew.   Orbiter and target state vectors from the shuttle GNC computers, which had been improved with radar data, 
would be used.  However, the re-programming of the shuttle GNC computers had erased the statistical information 
concerning star tracker passes and the previous incorporation of radar data.  Mission Control opted for the Ti-Delay 
maneuver and to fly an additional orbit to provide more time (about 90 minutes) for improving the on-board navigation 
data using the radar, before an intercept trajectory was initiated.
After the Mission Control computed Ti-Delay was performed (item 7 in Figure 29), two on-board troubleshooting Ti 
targeting attempts succeeded while another failed.  The Ti and subsequent maneuvers were performed using burn solutions 
voiced to the crew from Mission Control.  At orbital sunrise, just before the start of the proximity operations phase, the 
Endeavour commander reported that INTELSAT was in the cross hairs of the Crew Optical Alignment Sight (device on the 
left side of Figure 27), indicating a nominal approach trajectory for initiating proximity operations (item 12 in Figure 29, 
Figure 32).
Figure 31  Screen print of Mission Control Fault Display listing targeting failures. 
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Successful Capture and Repair of INTELSAT On Flight Day 7
Previous shuttle RCS jet plume torques had driven the INTELSAT spin axis nearly 90 degrees out of the orbital plane.  The 
commander rotated Endeavour nearly 90 degrees about the roll axis and performed a fly-around to place the spin axis into the 
payload bay.  Endeavour was then maneuvered so that the INTELSAT was within reach of the EVA crew (Figure 32).  
INTELSAT was grabbed (Figure 33), the capture bar was put in place, and the RMS then grappled the INTELSAT and 
berthed it in the payload bay.
1. Delay Capture Attempts 
Until Sunrise
2. Roll Endeavour to Achieve 
Capture Attitude
3. INTELSAT Captured by 
EVA Crew
+ R Bar
+ V Bar
•1•2
•3
Figure 32  Sketch of proximity 
operations after the third rendezvous 
on flight day 7.
Figure 33  Three EVA crew captured INTELSAT on 
flight day 7.
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Figure 34  INTELSAT and hardware used
for berthing and PKM attachment.
Capture Bar
Perigee Kick 
Motor
I-VI SMA 
Adapter
Cradle
Super*Zip 
Fly-Away 
Ring
INTELSAT VI
N
AS
A
The EVA crew attached a new PKM to the satellite (Figure 
34).  The INTELSAT was deployed from Endeavour (Figure 
35).  After Endeavour had separated to a safe distance, the 
PKM was successfully fired. The satellite eventually reached 
geosynchronous orbit and commenced operations (Figure 
36, steps 3 through 8).
Figure 35  INTELSAT deployed with a 
new perigee kick motor.
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Investigation of The Lambert Targeting Anomaly
While the Flight Day 7 rendezvous was still in progress, a software investigation involving several NASA and contractor 
organizations was initiated.16,17 The failure of the targeting algorithm to converge was isolated to the use of one double 
precision and two single precision parameters in a double precision mid-value selection library function.18 To ensure the 
successful completion of the remaining mission activities and the safe return of Endeavour to Earth, the orbit and entry GNC 
software was examined to determine if there were any other cases of mixed precision use that could cause problems.  Ascent 
GNC software was also examined.  No other instances of mixed precision use were found.  
In 1989, three years before STS-49 flew, it was discovered that a double precision mid-value selection library function 
actually operated on the three input parameters as if they were single precision.  An analysis of all uses of the function in the 
flight software was performed and the function was corrected so that all inputs were treated as double precision.  STS-49 
was the first mission to fly a rendezvous after the correction had been made.  It should be noted that the targeting failure did
not occur before the flight in the extensive software and integrated avionics testing processes (conducted in multiple 
facilities using shuttle flight computers).  The failure did not occur during integrated simulations with Mission Control and 
the crew in a simulator, nor did it occur in the 35 previous executions of Lambert targeting during STS-49.  The 
investigation also found that the Ti maneuver was the only one susceptible to the anomaly.  The mid-course maneuvers 
could have been targeted on-board rather than by Mission Control.
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Figure 36  INTELSAT antenna deployment sequence.
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The next rendezvous mission, STS-56 (April 1993), used the same software version as STS-49.  A set of convergence criteria 
was set to more liberal values to prevent the anomaly from occurring. No targeting failures occurred during the mission.  
STS-57 (June-July 1993) was the first flight of a new software version that included a source code fix for the STS-49 
anomaly and a code change to improve convergence on a burn solution.  Lambert targeting software used during the STS-
57 retrieval of the European Space Agency EURECA satellite performed with no difficulties. 
Keys to the Success of STS-49 and Lessons Learned
The INTELSAT capture and repair, coupled with multiple technical problems that had to be resolved in flight, made STS-
49 one of the most challenging space shuttle missions ever flown.  One key to successful development and execution of 
procedural work-arounds to salvage the mission was the existence of a multi-disciplinary flight control team trained in real-
time problem analysis and resolution (Figures 37 and 38).19  The use of the new Payload Bay program and the new laser 
sensors lowered propellant consumption during proximity operations.  This contributed to the successful execution of three 
rendezvous and three proximity operations phases in the presence of tight propellant budget constraints.  A number of 
important lessons concerning software were learned.
• Examine And Test Any Changes Made To Code Used Within Iteration Loops. Changes to library functions or 
other code used within an iteration loop can alter software functionality or prevent convergence.   Convergence 
characteristics of an iteration algorithm should be tested, documented, and understood over the entire range of iteration 
parameter values, including values that are not representative of the mission.  Use of mixed precision parameters should be 
avoided.
• Conduct Thorough, Independent Reviews Of Analysis And Technical Reports. Limited review by technical and 
management personnel may not catch subtle technical issues that can later negatively impact flight performance.  The 
increasing complexity of aerospace vehicles requires more specialists to assess questionable performance, impacts of 
technical issues, and performance impacts of proposed modifications.  Independent examination and critique of data and 
analysis by personnel in multiple organizations is useful for ensuring the quality of performance analysis, risk assessments, 
requirements, mission planning, test procedures, and mission execution procedures.  Results of simulations, flight tests, and 
anomaly documentation should be made available to all project personnel.
• Create Legible Software Requirements Documentation For Those Who Are Not Software Developers. This 
documentation is used by engineering and operations personnel throughout a flight program for insight into software design 
and functionality.  Well-designed and well-written documentation makes it easier for technical and management personnel 
to research and understand requirements.  This improves the quality performance analysis, issue resolution, testing 
requirements definition, and procedure development.  Document organization, page layout, and type setting should permit 
the reader to easily read and comprehend the requirements at various levels (line of code, task, module, integrated sets of 
software).  Headings should be easily located visually, as well as through a table of contents.  Characteristics of data 
transferred from module to module should be clearly defined.  Flow charts and written descriptions should enable the 
reader to easily understand where a specific module fits in the overall software architecture, what data it requires, and other 
tasks dependencies.  Declaration of variable types in software requirements should be next to the task in which the variables 
are used, not in another section of the requirements document.
Figure 37  The STS-49 Mission Control
Rendezvous Execute Team (Orbit 1).
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Figure 38  The STS-49 Mission Control
Planning Team (Orbit 3).
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Rendezvous Lambert Targeting Anomaly Before STS-51
The STS-51 mission of Discovery concerned the deployment and retrieval of the Orbiting and Retrievable Far and Extreme 
Ultraviolet Spectrometer Shuttle Pallet Satellite (ORFEUS-SPAS) scientific satellite (Figures 39 and 40), and the deployment 
of the Advanced Communications Technology Satellite (Figure 40).
This incident concerns a Lambert targeting failure due to a software improvement introduced in response to the STS-49 
anomaly.  On the evening of Wednesday, September 8, 1993, a Lambert targeting failure (from a different part of the 
targeting software than the STS-49 anomaly) occurred during Ti targeting in an integrated simulation involving Mission 
Control and astronauts in the Shuttle Mission Simulator.  The simulation used the new software that contained the verified 
and flight proven code fix for the STS-49 anomaly.  Since the launch of STS-51 was scheduled for Sunday, September 12, an 
extensive investigation effort by multiple organizations was initiated. 
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Figure 40  STS-51 Primary and secondary payloads in the payload bay.
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Figure 39  STS-51 ORFEUS-SPAS.
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Investigation of the Targeting Failure and Development of a Procedural Work-Around
By Friday morning, the failure had been duplicated by the author in the Shuttle Software Production Facility using shuttle 
software and a shuttle flight computer (Figure 41).15 Data was distributed to all parties involved in the investigation that 
morning.  By 5 pm on Saturday the 11th, the source of the failure had been identified as a rare numerical condition associated 
with the convergence improvement code introduced after STS-49.  It was limited to rendezvous targeting, would not impact 
any other software functions or flight phases, and was not a constraint to the upcoming mission.  Should the failure occur 
during the STS-51 rendezvous, a procedural work-around was developed and the STS-51 crew was briefed on the procedure 
the day before the launch.  
Correction of the New Targeting Failure
The STS-51 rendezvous with ORFEUS-SPAS was successfully conducted with no targeting failures occurring during the 
mission (Figures 42 and 43).  Post flight, another investigation resulted in a software change to prevent the new anomaly 
from reoccurring.  Analysis showed that the occurrence of this anomaly was less frequent than the STS-49 anomaly.  Starting 
with the first rendezvous mission after STS-49 (STS-56, April 1993) through STS-114 (July-August of 2005), 45 shuttle 
missions have exercised the Lambert targeting software with no software anomalies occurring in flight.  In addition, none 
have occurred in software testing and pre-mission training simulations since the fall of 1993.
Lessons Learned From the STS-51 Pre-Flight Anomaly
• Quantify The Benefit Of Proposed Improvements To Software. Unneeded changes to software to improve 
performance can introduce technical problems that will later have to be investigated and resolved.  Time and effort spent on 
a “nice-to-have” improvement can reduce resources needed to address higher priority issues.   Changes to flight critical 
software should not be made unless the changes have been verified in off-line simulations and there is an identifiable benefit 
in terms of performance and risk reduction.
Figure 41  Failed Ti targeting attempt recreated before the 1993 launch of Discovery
on STS-51.
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• Educate Later Generations of Engineers on Theoretical Principals and Requirements Rationale Possessed By 
Those That Developed The Computer Algorithms. Many engineers and Mission Control flight controllers worked on 
the STS-49 and STS-51 investigations that were not involved in the original development of the shuttle rendezvous software 
in the late 1970s.  Much of the theoretical and functional insight that they gained during the investigations has been 
preserved in improved training materials and Mission Control handbooks. Documentation from the Lambert targeting 
investigations has been collected and archived to ensure future access.20
Figure 42  ORFEUS-SPAS after deploy-
ment from Discovery on flight day 2.
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Figure 43  ORFEUS-SPAS after capture
by the RMS on flight day 8.
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Zero Doppler Steering Maneuver Anomaly Before STS-59
Investigation of the Maneuver Failure
Flight controllers contacted shuttle software and flight control system specialists and a discrepancy report was written.  An 
investigation by multiple Shuttle Program organizations quickly identified the problem as a precision loss in a single 
precision attitude accumulator in the flight control software.  Truncation in the accumulator resulted if the accumulated 
attitude change was above 256 degrees in any component.  The anomaly was duplicated in several ground facilities that 
used shuttle software on shuttle computers or functional equivalents of the shuttle software.  The shuttle flight control 
software was modified to reset all components if the absolute value of any component of the accumulated attitude 
exceeded 180 degrees.
This flight control system behavior had not been previously observed, as long duration low rate attitude maneuvers of this 
type had never before been a requirement for a shuttle mission. Previous shuttle attitude maneuvers were shorter in 
duration and higher in rotational rate. The truncation of digits when above 256 degrees was insignificant compared to the 
magnitude of maneuvers previously performed by the shuttle during 13 years of missions.  However, for Zero Doppler 
Steering the accuracy loss due to truncation was significant. 
Correction of the Software Anomaly
A software fix was implemented and verified before the launch of STS-59.  Flight control system performance on both 
STS-59 and STS-68 was as expected.  Zero Doppler Steering successfully removed Earth rotation effects from the radar 
data.  It was also successfully performed in support of the Infrared Spectral Imaging Radiometer flown on STS-85 and the 
Shuttle Radar Topography Mission flown on STS-99.
Figure 44  The Space Radar Lab in the 
payload bay of Endeavour.
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This anomaly is associated with shuttle flight control system 
performance in support of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory’s Space Radar 
Laboratory (SRL).   The SRL flew in the payload bay of Endeavour on 
STS-59 (April 1994) and STS-68 (September/October 1994).  
Endeavour flew in a 57-degree inclination orbit to map a significant 
portion of the Earth’s surface (Figure 44).  To remove the effects of 
Earth rotation from the radar data, Zero Doppler Steering maneuvers 
were performed throughout the SRL data collection periods.  The 8-
degree yaw maneuvers were of long duration (typically around 45 
minutes) and were executed at a rate of 0.003 degrees/second.
Maneuver Fails to Meet Mission Requirements
Before each shuttle mission, integrated mission simulations with flight 
controllers in Mission Control and astronauts in the Shuttle Mission 
Simulator are conducted.  Several weeks before the launch of STS-59, 
the Mission Control Guidance and Control officer noted that the 
length of the Zero Doppler Steering maneuvers were either shorter or 
longer than expected.  For example, one maneuver expected to last 31 
minutes took 62 minutes to complete, and another maneuver expected 
to last 44 minutes was completed in 34 minutes.  Were this to occur 
during flight, much of the radar data would have been corrupted.
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Lesson Learned From The STS-59 Anomaly
• Operation to Meet New Mission Requirements May Involve Performance Under Conditions That the System 
Was Not Designed to Support. This can result in performance that does not meet requirements and threatens mission 
success. New and evolving mission requirements and procedures should be examined and compared to the verified 
performance envelope of the flight system to determine if additional testing is required.  
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Excessive Propellant Consumption During Rendezvous On STS-69
STS-69 was the third flight of the Shuttle Pointed Autonomous Tool For Astronomy 201 (SPARTAN-201) and the second 
of the Wake Shield Facility (WSF) (although WSF was carried on STS-60 but not deployed due to an anomaly).  This was the 
first mission on which two different payloads would be deployed and retrieved. 
SPARTAN-201 observations of the solar atmosphere and solar wind were scheduled to occur at the same time as the flight 
of the Ulysses spacecraft over the north polar region of the sun.  SPARTAN was deployed from Endeavor on Flight Day 2 
and retrieved on Flight Day 4 (Figure 45).  Wake Shield was designed to provide a vacuum space environment for growing 
thin films for future electronic circuits.  WSF was deployed on Flight Day 5 (Figure 46) and retrieved on Flight Day 8.
Propellant Consumption During the SPARTAN-201 Rendezvous
During execution of the NCC maneuver on the SPARTAN-201 rendezvous 4.3 times as much propellant was used as was 
predicted before the flight.  The desired position for the next burn, Transition Initiation, was missed by 0.96 nautical miles. 
However, execution of all burns after NCC was as expected, and SPARTAN-201 was successfully retrieved.  New 
procedures to prevent a repeat of the performance problem were created by Mission Control personnel and applied to the 
rendezvous later in the mission with Wake Shield.  All maneuvers during the Wake Shield rendezvous were executed without 
incident.
Post Flight Investigation
Post flight analysis revealed a performance limitation in a rendezvous software algorithm.  The algorithm had been developed 
in the 1960s for the Apollo vehicles and had been adopted for use in the shuttle software in 1977.  The performance 
limitation was known to Apollo era personnel and shuttle personnel early in the Shuttle Program.  However, knowledge of 
the limitation had not been documented and passed on to newer personnel.  The performance limitation had not been 
encountered on any of the 18 previous shuttle missions that exercised the software.
After the mission an extensive analysis effort was conducted to explore and define the performance envelope of the 
algorithm.  New Mission Control and crew procedures were developed.  Algorithm functionality and the performance 
limitation was documented and incorporated into flight rules, training, and procedures handbooks to ensure that the problem 
would not be encountered in the future.
Figure 45  SPARTAN-201 (left) just before 
it was grappled with the Remote 
Manipulator System (right) on 
September 10, 1995.
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Figure 46  The Wake Shield Facility before 
deployment using the Remote Manipulator 
System on September 11, 1995.
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Lesson Learned From STS-69
• Document the theoretical rationale, assumptions made, and performance limitations inherent in software.
Performance limitations of software can exist that users in the original or subsequent application may not be aware of.  Such 
limitations could threaten mission success or safety of flight. Particular care should be used when software from legacy flight
programs is applied to a new vehicle.  New users of algorithms should be able to track down the historical information 
concerning algorithm design and performance.
37 of 49
Global Positioning System Receiver And Associated Shuttle Flight
Software Anomalies On STS-91
Shuttle Test Flights of the GPS Receiver
In the early 1990s, the Shuttle Program began to study the replacement of the space shuttle’s three TACAN entry 
navigation units with three Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers.21 GPS would also be used on-orbit for purposes 
that did not require precision orbit determination. NASA hoped to reduce development time and costs using an off-the-
shelf and in production receiver.  After a trade study, a GPS receiver entering production for military aviation applications 
was selected for the Shuttle Program.  The receiver met the requirements of the original customers and has been 
successfully used in a wide variety of atmospheric flight applications since then.
GPS Receiver and Shuttle Software Anomalies During STS-91
The shuttle GNC flight computer propagates and supplies an aiding state vector to the GPS receiver.  The receiver filters it 
using GPS measurements and returns it as an updated state vector (the GPS state vector) to the shuttle GNC computer 
(Figure 49).  The GPS state vector, if it passes a number of shuttle flight computer quality assurance checks, is then 
designated as a “selected” GPS state and can be used to replace the current shuttle navigation state vector when required.  
When the anomalies occurred on STS-91, GPS updates to the shuttle navigation state were inhibited.
If the GPS receiver deems the GPS state vector to be healthy, the shuttle GNC computer uses it to periodically update the 
current aiding state vector sent to the GPS receiver to limit error growth during state propagation.  When an aiding state 
vector update is performed, a signal is sent to the GPS receiver to indicate that an update has occurred.  Upon receipt of 
this information, the GPS receiver sends an acknowledgement back to the shuttle GNC flight computer.
GPS 
GPS  
Figure 48  GPS antenna 
boresights for flights with 
one GPS receiver.
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From 1993 to 1996, a pre-production version of the receiver was flown on 
seven shuttle missions for data gathering and identification of software 
modifications to improve receiver performance.  Starting with STS-79 in 
September of 1996, a production receiver modified for the shuttle application 
was flown on many shuttle missions (Figure 48 and Table 3).  The integration 
architecture enabled the receiver and associated shuttle flight computer 
software to be flown in a data gathering mode without modification to the 
existing, proven shuttle navigation system.  Flight test results were used to 
determine what further receiver and shuttle flight computer modifications 
were necessary so the receiver and associated shuttle computer software could 
eventually be certified for operational use. From 1993 through 1998, the 
receiver was interfaced with the Backup Flight System flight computer during 
ascent and entry and a laptop computer while on-orbit.  STS-91 represented 
the first flight on which the GPS receiver interfaced with the Shuttle’s Primary 
Avionics Software Subsystem (PASS) GNC flight computer during all flight 
phases.  This gave Mission Control personnel access to GPS receiver data in 
real-time during the orbital phase of the mission.
STS-91 (June 1998) was the final flight of a Space shuttle to the Mir space station 
(Figure 47).  Discovery returned astronaut Andrew Thomas to Earth after a long duration
stay on Mir.  This incident concerns GPS receiver and shuttle software anomalies that 
occurred during the mission. A problem in one system component can result in 
inappropriate interaction with an interfacing component and trigger undesirable and 
unanticipated effects that cascade throughout an avionics system.  The root causes, 
manifestations, and vehicle-wide impacts of dysfunctional individual system 
components are difficult and often impossible to predict. 
Figure 47  Mir as seen 
from Discovery on STS-91.
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Near the end of Flight Day 6 (the day after Discovery had left the Mir space station), a GPS receiver software anomaly 
occurred, that triggered a receiver automatic software reset (similar to a “ctrl-alt-delete” on a personal computer).  At the 
same time, the shuttle GNC computer sent an aiding state update indication to the receiver.  The GPS receiver did not 
detect the change in the update command flag, due to the GPS receiver reset in progress, and never sent the GNC computer 
an acknowledgement that it had performed processing related to the update (Figure 49).  The shuttle computer continued to 
send the update indication.  It was not detected by the GPS receiver as the GPS receiver was looking for a change in the 
update command indication (which had already occurred), rather than testing the value of the command.  As a result, future 
aiding state updates in the shuttle GNC computer did not occur. The old aiding state continued to be propagated in the 
GNC computer with increasing error and provided to the GPS receiver.  
Consequently, after about 8 hours of propagation, the inaccuracy in the aiding vector exceeded computation limits.  The 
GNC computer issued a large number of mathematical conversion errors at a high rate over the avionics system 
communications bus.  The large number of error messages prevented the transmission of shuttle state vectors from the
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Table 3  Space Shuttle GPS Test Flights For TACAN Replacement
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GNC flight computer to a Systems Management (SM) computer.  These state vectors are used for automatic antenna 
selection for communication via the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) and ground stations.  This caused a 
failure of the SM computer to automatically transition from the TDRSS-West to the TDRSS-East satellite.  The SM 
computer kept selecting an antenna for TDRSS-West, even though it was obscured by the Earth.  Antenna selection for 
ground stations was also corrupted.  Mission Control lost communications with Discovery during a scheduled crew sleep 
period.§ Erratic communication through a ground station began 30 minutes after the initial loss of communication, and 
communications through TDRSS-West was restored 39 minutes after the outage began. 
Shuttle Avionics System Recovery
Manual antenna selection for both TDRSS and ground stations was performed by Mission Control to protect against 
another communications outage.  Mission Control awoke the crew at the normally scheduled wake-up time, about an hour 
after TDRSS communication was reestablished.  The GPS receiver was powered off after a power cycle failed to restore the 
GPS receiver to proper operation.  Software from the GNC and SM computers was transmitted to Mission Control for 
analysis.  The crew activated another shuttle computer loaded with PASS GNC software to replace the one emitting the 
error messages and powered off the suspect computer.  The state vector provided to the SM computer assumed the correct 
value and proper TDRSS antenna selection occurred. The GPS receiver was powered up for a short time later for a series of 
tests, but was turned off for the remainder of the flight (including entry) due to the on-orbit anomalies.  In the hours after 
the anomaly, an investigation was conducted that focused on ensuring the anomalies did not result from any generic 
problems that could impact mission success or safe return of the orbiter and crew.  None were found.
Investigation of the GPS Receiver and Shuttle Software Anomalies
The investigation effort involving teams of technical and management personnel from several NASA and contractor 
organizations continued for the remainder of the mission and also for two months after Discovery returned to Earth.  Shuttle 
Program management assigned action items to the teams to conduct a rigorous search for the causes of the GPS receiver, 
shuttle GNC computer, and SM computer anomalies, as well as any software process inadequacies. 
§ The incident occurred early in the morning Houston time on June 9, 1998.  The author was awakened at 1:34 am by a phone call from the Mission 
Control Flight Dynamics Officer.  Many NASA and contractor personnel were called to Mission Control at that time to begin working the problem.
Figure 49  STS-91 GPS and shuttle software anomalies.
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Investigation findings and the corresponding corrective actions were:
• Finding - A GPS receiver software anomaly, that had not been observed before, triggered the automatic reset.  This 
caused the receiver software to miss the change in the aiding state update indication. 
• Corrective Action - A GPS receiver software correction was made and verified through laboratory and later shuttle flight-
testing. 
• Finding - Parallel development of interface software for the GPS receiver and shuttle flight computer resulted in 
inadequate software requirements.  This caused the GPS receiver to miss the aiding state update indication.  It also caused 
the GNC computer to continue transmission of the update flag to the GPS receiver and the GNC computer never updated 
the aiding state.  
• Corrective Action - The shuttle GNC computer/GPS receiver interface was “bullet-proofed” from all known or 
postulated forms of input. shuttle GNC software interfaces with other shuttle navigation aids were also examined for any 
similar problems with commanding and data handling.  None were found.
• Finding - Shuttle flight computer aiding state processing did not protect against aiding state error growth over periods of 
longer than desirable propagation or aiding state vector updates with state vectors of questionable quality.
• Corrective Action - Changes were made to shuttle flight computer aiding state processing to ensure that aiding state 
updates would occur independent of interaction between the shuttle flight computer with the GPS receiver.  In addition, 
state vectors used for aiding state updates would have to pass additional quality assurance checks.
• Finding - Examination of computer communication bus software revealed a requirements deficiency that permitted state 
vector data sent from the GNC computer to the SM computer to be overwritten by high rate error messages, resulting in a  
communications loss with Discovery.  
• Corrective Action - The computer communication bus software was modified to ensure error messages would not 
overwrite data needed for antenna selection. 
• Finding - An issue identified during testing of shuttle flight computer software supporting GPS was not appropriately 
processed before flight.
• Corrective Action - Improvements were incorporated into the shuttle software testing process.  
Following STS-91, extensive ground and flight-testing validated the effectiveness of the GPS receiver and shuttle flight 
computer software improvements (Table 3 and Figure 50).
Project Changes Resulting From the Investigation
In the fall of 1997, the Shuttle Program had approved the removal of three TACAN units from Atlantis and the installation 
of three GPS receivers.  By the time of STS-91 (June of 1998), the TACAN removal and GPS installation had been 
performed, and Atlantis was scheduled to make the first no TACAN, all GPS flight in 1999.  As a result of the STS-91 
incident the Shuttle Program decided to perform more GPS receiver test flights and additional ground testing before 
TACAN replacement.  Two of the three GPS receivers were removed from Atlantis and three TACAN units were 
reinstalled.
Significant changes were made to the shuttle/GPS integration and certification process.  The contract with the GPS vendor 
was changed so the vendor could participate in the project at a higher level.  Expanded vendor involvement after STS-91 
brought much needed design insight to the project, that greatly aided issue identification and resolution for STS-91 and 
subsequent shuttle missions and laboratory testing.  Weekly teleconferences involving all project participants were 
conducted.  Face-to-face meetings were held at the Johnson Space Center two to four times a year.  Issue tracking and 
visibility was enhanced.  Since the GPS receiver software had originally been developed at government expense, the Shuttle 
Program was able to get access to the source code.  The NASA Independent Verification and Validation contractor began a 
review of GPS receiver source code which included reviewing changes made in support of the shuttle integration.  Shuttle 
Program personnel gained access to receiver software requirements documents.  Additional interim receiver software 
versions were planned and additional flight and ground testing was conducted to resolve issues and verify software 
performance.  In addition to GPS receiver telemetry sent to Mission Control, a laptop computer was carried on many 
shuttle flights after STS-91 to record receiver instrumentation port data.  This data was instrumental in allowing the GPS 
receiver vendor to quickly diagnose GPS software problems with complex root causes.
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Figure 50 illustrates the number of changes made to the shuttle GPS receiver software (or “link” as it is called within the 
Shuttle Program) over a 10 year period.  The shuttle missions that flew with each software version are indicated.  In early 
1998, before the flight of STS-91, it was expected that three-string Link 3 would be certified as the GPS receiver software 
version that would be used on the first no TACAN, all GPS flight.  In reality, 4 additional software versions were produced.  
Before the receiver software could be certified a total of 93 changes (Links 4 and 5) had to be made, tested, and verified.  
The first all GPS, no TACAN flight will fly with Link 7.
Subsequent GPS Test Flights
Between 1996 and 2005, over 7,000 hours of nominal GPS receiver operating time has been accumulated on shuttle 
missions flown by Columbia, Discovery, Atlantis and Endeavour, each equipped with a single GPS receiver (Table 3 and Figure 
50).  Receiver and shuttle GNC computer performance in flight and in extensive laboratory tests indicate that software 
modifications and software process improvements have been effective.
Ionospheric Scintillation
Two articles on threats to the integrity of GPS navigation that appeared in Aviation Week & Space Technology in December of 
1997 motivated shuttle GPS project members to study ionospheric scintillation.22,23 Most personnel were not familiar with 
this phenomenon and collected and studied published material on scintillation from a variety of industry and academic 
sources.  In addition, contacts were made with members of the navigation and academic communities that were researching 
scintillation.  Although scintillation effects during shuttle GPS test flights had not been noted, personnel became familiar 
with the phenomenon and how it could impact GPS receiver performance.  In April of 1998 Mission Control and other 
GPS project personnel were briefed on the issue.
On the evening of November 3, 1998, during the flight of STS-95, a Mission Control Ascent/Entry Guidance and 
Procedures Officer noted velocity noise in GPS data off the coast of South America, during the early evening hours.  
Additional noise periods were noted during the mission where geographic and temporal characteristics were consistent with 
ionospheric scintillation.  The Shuttle Program was able to quickly conduct an investigation into the velocity noise due to 
previous research conducted along with the existing contacts in the navigation and scientific communities.  The investigation 
concluded that the noise was due to ionospheric scintillation, but it was not a constraint to the use of GPS data by the 
shuttle.  Mission Control and GPS personnel are trained on the phenomenon and it is tracked in post flight analysis, with 
two published papers on the topic.24,25
TACAN Replacement By GPS
The GPS receiver and associated shuttle computer software was finally certified for TACAN replacement in August of 2002, 
over three years after the original target date.  On October 23, 2003, the Shuttle Program approved the removal of the three 
TACAN units from Endeavour and the installation of two additional GPS receivers.  The orbiters Atlantis and Discovery most 
likely will continue to fly with three TACAN units and one GPS receiver due to the accelerated end of the Shuttle Program.  
Starting with STS-121, an operational ramp-up of increasing GPS use in flight will lead to parallel processing of TACAN 
and GPS during entry by Atlantis and Discovery.  The first all GPS, no TACAN flight of Endeavour will occur after the 
operational ramp-up and is currently scheduled for STS-116.
Lessons Learned From STS-91 and the Shuttle GPS Project
Since 1998, lessons and experiences from the shuttle GPS project have been disseminated internally within the Shuttle 
Program and have also been the subject of several publications available outside the Shuttle Program (Table 4).  A set of 
GPS lessons learned was submitted to the NASA Public Lessons Learned System in June of 2002.  A compilation of lessons 
learned and experiences was also published as a NASA contractor report.¶ 26 A summary of some of those lessons follows.
¶ Another NASA report, Three Years of Global Positioning System Experience on International Space Station, was also published covering lessons learned from the 
International Space Station GPS Project.27
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Title
Shuttle GPS Upgrade COTS/MOTS Issues & Lessons 
Learned*
Scintillation Effects On Space Shuttle GPS Data*
Scintillation Effects On Space Shuttle GPS Data†
Space Shuttle Navigation in the GPS Era
Global Scale Observations Of Ionospheric 
Instabilities From GPS In Low Earth Orbit
Quantifying GDOP Degradations Caused by 
Removing Satellites from a GPS Constellation 
Lessons Learned From Flights of “Off the Shelf”
Aviation Navigation Units on the Space Shuttle*
Parallel Processing: GPS Augments TACAN in the 
Space Shuttle
GPS In Earth Orbit – Experiences From The Space 
Shuttle, International Space Station And Crew Return 
Vehicle Programs
The Space Shuttle and GPS – A Safety-Critical 
Navigation Upgrade
A Software Perspective On GNSS Receiver 
Integration and Operation
Lessons Learned From Flights of “Off the Shelf”
Aviation Navigation Units on the Space Shuttle‡
A GPS Receiver Upgrade For The Space Shuttle –
Rationale And Considerations
Ionospheric Instability Observed in Low Earth Orbit 
Using Global Positioning System
Application of GPS Navigation to Space Flight
GPS Lessons Learned From The ISS, Space
Shuttle, and X-38
Date
Oct. 1999
Oct. 2000
Jan. 2001
Jan. 2001
Aug. 2001
Sept. 2001
May 2002
Oct. 2002
Nov. 2002
Feb. 2003
May 2003
Oct. 2003
July 2004
Jan.-Feb.
2005 
March 2005
Nov. 2005
Conference or Publication
NASA Avionics Technology Working 
Group
26th Joint Services Data Exchange and 
GPS Users Conference
ION National Technical Meeting
ION National Technical Meeting
AIAA Space 2001 Conference
ION GPS 2001 Conference
Joint Navigation Conference
GPS World Magazine
Core Technologies for Space Systems 
Conference
2nd International Conference on COTS-
Based Software Systems
International Space University 
Conference on Satellite Navigation 
Systems
NASA Public Lessons Learned System, 
Entry 1370 
40th AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint 
Propulsion Conference 
AIAA Journal of Spacecraft and 
Rockets 
IEEE Aerospace Conference
NASA Contractor Report 
CR-2005-213693
* Limited distribution
† Derivative work
‡ Submitted on June 11, 2002.  Approved for inclusion on October 20, 2003.
http://www.nasa.gov/offices/oce/llis/home/index.html
Table 4  Publications Concerning the Space Shuttle GPS Project
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• Judging The Maturity Of Off-The-Shelf Technology Can Be Difficult.  False and simplistic perceptions of the 
maturity or flexibility of off-the-shelf technology can result in higher risk of budget problems, schedule slips, and late 
discovery of technical issues.  A close relationship with the vendor, other users of the technology, and consultants early in a 
project can help a systems integrator identify potential challenges.  The implications of software reuse should be identified 
and understood when formulating requirements for resources and schedule and during risk identification.28 Schedule and 
resources should include interim software versions to allow issues to be discovered and resolved before a mission is flown.
• Investigate The Original Requirements And Operating Environment For Any Off-The-Shelf Hardware And 
Software. Introduction of off-the-shelf hardware and software into a new operating environment can lead to manifestation 
of issues that impact unit and integrated system performance.  Performance problems that are of concern in a new 
application may not have been an issue for the original integrator and previous users of the unit.  The vendor can provide 
insight into original unit requirements, functionality, and operating environment that can reduce risk during the 
requirements definition, testing, and mission execution phases of a program.
• Document Assumptions Made About Operation And Performance of Off-the-Shelf Hardware and Software.
Lack of visibility into software requirements and functionality can force requirements developers for other parts of the 
avionics system to make assumptions.  If incorrect, these assumptions can result in software anomalies and overall poor 
performance during testing and mission execution.  Any assumptions made should be documented and remain visible to 
project participants until the issue is resolved either through testing (both stand-alone and integrated) or acquisition of 
detailed information about hardware and software functionality. Ramifications of faulty assumptions should be understood.
• Understand The Limitations Of The Simulation Environment.  Test equipment features may limit the duration and 
fidelity of testing.  This restricts the ability of the project to subject avionics to conditions representative of the flight 
environment, increasing the possibility of technical issues arising during flight.  Limitations in simulator modeling should be 
documented and understood so risks can be identified and appropriate changes made to test plans and facilities.
• Compare Test Results To Interface Requirements Documentation. An inaccurate Interface Control Document 
(ICD) can result in requirements deficiencies in other parts of the integrated system.   Faulty analysis of test data and 
development of incorrect operational procedures can also occur. All interfaces should be thoroughly tested. Particular 
attention should be paid to software conditions that could prevent the receipt or acknowledgement of commands and data.  
Changes to the ICD or ICD issues arising from testing and inspections of code and requirements should be visible to all 
personnel.  Accurate and up-to-date interface documentation should be available to software requirements developers.
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Overall Lessons Learned
A number of lessons learned apply to most of the incidents discussed in this report.  These are:
• Collect, Study, And Apply Lessons Learned And Experiences From Other Projects And Flight Programs. Risks 
to technology integration, resources and schedule may not be effectively mitigated if lessons from other programs are not 
studied and heeded.  Technical and organizational causes of problems encountered tend to be common across a wide range 
of disciplines in industry.  Acquisition and dissemination of well-written lessons learned and formal accident investigation 
reports can help technical and management personnel identify opportunities for improvement at both the technical and 
management levels.
• Conduct Comprehensive Integrated Testing Before Flying. Software intensive components in an integrated system 
can possess requirements deficiencies that cause poor performance, leading to a failure to meet mission objectives.  These 
issues may not be detectable during stand-alone testing of individual units.  Mission requirements and procedures should be 
examined to determine if additional testing is required to cover flight system operations under non-verified conditions.
• Plan For Adequate Time And Number of Personnel To Analyze Flight And Ground Test Data. Subtle 
performance issues may be detectable in test data that has not been examined, or only examined in a cursory manner.  
Prompt and thorough analysis can catch software, hardware, and requirements problems early enough to permit resolution 
without risking project success.
• Create And Maintain Rigorous Documentation Of Issues Identified In Testing And During Flight. A failure to 
appropriately document and call attention to potential system performance issues can threaten mission success.  All test and 
flight data should be examined and any unexplained issues should be documented and visible to project participants.  
Anomaly documentation, closure rational, and supporting data should be archived in a manner that facilitates preservation 
and easy retrieval.  Development and certification processes for hardware and software should be closed loop in nature, 
enabling those concerned with anomalies to track issue status and closure rationale.  Disposition of past issues that did not 
result in proven software fixes should be reexamined for continued validity as in software regression testing.  Effective 
knowledge capture and management increases the skill level within a project and results in more effective and timely 
prevention, identification, and resolution of anomalies.20
• Permit Lateral Communication Between Technical Personnel Across Organizational Boundaries. Restrictions on 
communication stemming from budget concerns, schedule concerns, and real or perceived organizational barriers can lead 
to inadequate project, hardware, and software requirements.  Regular contacts between project personnel from various 
organizations enables participants to better work together to identify and resolve technical issues in a timely manner.
• Communicate Frequently and Openly On Project Status. Project content increase (additional requirements, anomaly 
resolution efforts, etc.) and late identification of technical issues can create compressed schedules late in a project and 
negatively impact resources and schedule performance, software quality, as well as project success.   Project and program 
management should have access to status, requirements, job content, ground rules, and assumptions of all organizations 
when assessing project status and assessing technical, resource and schedule risk.
• Understand and Clearly Define The Responsibilities, Ground Rules, And Authority Of Boards, Teams, And 
Panels.  Poorly defined processes can prevent technical, cost and schedule concerns from receiving adequate attention in a 
timely manner.  Participants should have a thorough working knowledge of configuration control and processes for 
hardware and software in the flight system and supporting ground test facilities. Communications paths and organizational 
interfaces should be formally documented.  The actual practice and documentation of software and hardware processes 
should be periodically reviewed for consistency.  Any deviation from formally documented practices should be examined to 
determine if formal procedures should be improved, or if deviation from the documented process increases technical risk.#
# In his study of the 1994 friendly fire shoot down of U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters over the northern Iraqi no-fly zone, Dr. Scott A. Snook defined 
practical drift - “the slow, steady uncoupling of local practice from written procedure” to be a factor in the organizational, communications, and procedural 
failures that led to the tragedy.3
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• Train Project Personnel to Develop Operational Work-Arounds in Response to Anomalies. Undiscovered 
software anomalies can still exist after intensive ground testing and flight experience.  Successful ground and flight tests can
lead to a false sense of security about software maturity.  Some software anomalies will manifest only under specific and rare 
numerical conditions.  Personnel trained to perform creative problem solving and communication in an integrated team 
environment can respond rapidly to unexpected events that threaten mission success.  For mission critical situations where a 
software application failure can result in mission failure, operational workarounds should be developed and validated before 
flight.
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Conclusion
With the potential of new mission objectives and capabilities comes the challenge of integrating, certifying, and successfully 
flying missions using both off-the-shelf products and new technologies that are software intensive. Rigorous processes for 
requirements development, documentation of performance limitations, software and hardware development, testing, and 
incorporation of lessons learned are required to permit early detection of performance issues and identification of risk to 
resources and schedule. 
Space missions are often accompanied by anomalies, even if appropriate steps are taken to mitigate risk.  Flexibility in 
operations concepts, vehicle design, mission design, and resource planning permits effective recovery from anomalous 
performance.  Members of integrated interdisciplinary teams who are skilled at communication, problem analysis, and 
resolution enable mission objectives to be met.  A flight program that possesses these characteristics will be poised to 
achieve mission success.
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